As the negotiations lurch towards the endgame it is worth reflecting on the process which has brought the Brexit negotiations to the point of a no-deal outcome.

The possible withdrawal of the UK from the European Union has been on the agenda of a substantial portion of the UK political and media class for a generation, certainly since John Major’s premiership commenced in 1990. Major secured an opt-out for the UK from the single currency during the Maastricht Treaty controversies which bedevilled his government, a concession insufficient to appease Eurosceptic backbenchers. Margaret Thatcher had already secured a discount on the UK’s budget contribution and there were other opt-outs, for example from the passport-free Schengen arrangements, but no special deals have ever been enough for the minority on the Tory right.

There had always been a Eurosceptic minority on the Labour benches too, including that party’s current leader Jeremy Corbyn – Euroscepticism has never been an exclusively Tory obsession. For the Labour sceptics, Brussels was a capitalist plot, for Conservatives a threat of creeping socialism. That these conflicting views could simultaneously (and in most cases sincerely) be maintained as testament to the enduring incapacity of so many in the UK, including remainers, to peer across the Channel and comprehend accurately the EU which actually exists.

It is not the sovereign super-state, centralised and driven by unaccountable bureaucrats in Brussels, which British Eurosceptics have always alleged it to be. Had it been, it could have bargained with the ‘flexibility’ which Brexiteers have been demanding just like a sovereign state. It is a treaty organisation: a very important one and uniquely demanding of members, trading off sovereignty for economic advantage and political cohesion.

EU and sovereignty

This is not some everyday international treaty structure; most modern states are members of hundreds, in many cases thousands, of treaty organisations which impose obligations and costs, mainly minor. Interestingly the UK is a member of NATO, which imposes war-making obligations and heavy defence expenditure but has never for some reason provoked concerns about sovereignty. The EU does indeed diminish sovereignty; it requires a comprehensive sharing of market access and pooled decision-making across a huge and expanding range of competencies.

And it has made mistakes, with the premature and mismanaged single currency top of the list. But it is a treaty organisation nonetheless, legally incapable of doing deals on the fly and run by international civil servants charged first and foremost with defence of the treaties.

Some of the UK demands during the negotiations have been resisted for this straightforward reason. It would be amusing, if only the stakes were lower, to marvel at the incredulity of Brexiteers as the EU fails to behave in line with the malign caricature with which it has been conferred. It is this potent caricature which has ensured that concessions and opt-outs have never conciliated the UK’s Eurosceptics; if you believe that the EU is an evil and domineering super-state you want out, and concessions will never make any difference.

If Brexit ends badly for the UK, and events over the last few weeks make this increasingly likely, the historians will focus on two miscalculations by successive prime ministers who wished Britain to remain in the EU.

The first was David Cameron, who conceded a referendum in 2016 which always looked as if it could be lost. The opinion polls never pointed to a sure-fire ‘remain’ victory, it was a toss-up with a narrow result the likely outcome. No serious preparation had been undertaken for the enormous task of extricating the UK from 45 years of membership in the deepest trade bloc created in modern times.

Even more remarkable was the decision of Theresa May’s government in March 2017 to despatch the fateful Article 50 resignation letter to Brussels having ruled out the options which might have minimised the economic damage. That decision, it should not be forgotten, was supported by the Labour opposition now fretting visibly over the consequences. It is even more culpable that her government is still negotiating with itself about what kind of Brexit it wants, 18 months after the irrevocable resignation process, with its two-year fuse attached, was initiated.

Internal management

It has been evident throughout the period of UK membership that most MPs, in both main parties, were not in the Eurosceptic camp and that there was no incandescent upswelling of public opinion against Europe that simply had to be appeased.

The problem was internal management of the Conservative party and the threat of vote leakage to the anti-Europe UKIP, never strong enough to win seats but capable of swinging marginal constituencies to Labour in a first-past-the-post electoral system. Of the UK’s 650 MPs, it is estimated that around 480 voted to remain in 2016, including a majority of Conservative members. In the home of parliamentary sovereignty.

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