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Britain’s Conservative party has imploded over the last two weeks, leaderless and hammered at the European elections by the six-week-old Brexit party. Where, and when, did it all go wrong?
The failure of Theresa May’s three-year premiership was not pre-ordained. She campaigned (half-heartedly) for Remain and could have sought a soft form of Brexit from the outset, in view of the close referendum result and could have secured both EU agreement and a House of Commons majority. When she assumed office in July 2016, the Tory party contained far fewer hard-liners on Brexit. Instead she opted for the mantra-politics of “no deal is better than a bad deal”, blew her inherited majority in a snap election in 2017 and her premiership has ended in tears.
The seeds of May’s failure were sown in her first major policy speech at the Conservative party conference in Birmingham on 2 October 2016
There was no talk of a no-deal Brexit prior to the referendum or in its immediate aftermath, much less an electoral mandate for it. No-deal has now become a virility symbol for several of the leadership candidates including the favourite, Boris Johnson. The same Johnson who promised last year to make a “Titanic success” of Brexit, an unfortunate choice of metaphor.
The seeds of May’s failure were sown in her first major policy speech at the Conservative party conference in Birmingham on 2 October 2016. She had been less than three months in office. At Birmingham, May committed to immigration controls and an end to jurisdiction for the European Court, implying exit from the single market, but she rattled on about “frictionless trade” nonetheless. An impossible set of expectations was created which have fed the retreat from reality ever since. It is not possible to quit the EU while somehow remaining fully in the internal market, as her civil service advisers no doubt explained.
A no-deal crash-out four months from now will impose heavy costs on the United Kingdom. It would also impose heavy costs on the Irish economy, as the Taoiseach warned again last weekend. No responsible British government would expose the country to the needless risks involved.
The Tory leadership contest will be a bloody affair
But it now appears that this is precisely what is in the mind of May’s likely successor, even though it was decidedly not what anyone thought they were voting for, Johnson included.
The Tory leadership contest will be a bloody affair. Last time round, Johnson was also the bookmakers’ favourite but failed to snatch the crown and his public image of likeable buffoonery is not universally shared. He will be opposed by many Conservative MPs and there is a long record of surprise winners – May herself was one.
Johnson’s public commitment (“we will leave on 31 October, deal or no-deal”) is a weary restatement of the strategy which failed for May. The withdrawal agreement is closed according to the EU and the version of the Northern Ireland backstop it contains was fashioned in order to accommodate British red lines.
A critical issue is whether 31 October is really the end of EU patience, with no further extensions on offer
Unless the next UK premier opts for a trade border in the Irish Sea, unacceptable to the DUP, there is no way out and the change of leadership solves nothing.
A critical issue is whether 31 October is really the end of EU patience, with no further extensions on offer. Clearly, the Taoiseach is concerned that Theresa May’s departure has raised the likelihood of a no-deal crash-out.
While the odds have shortened on a crash-out, they may also have shortened on a simple revocation of Brexit – the UK is entitled to unilaterally withdraw the Article 50 resignation letter and resume EU membership as a result of a decision of the European Court last December. This could happen without a second referendum, but it is most unlikely.
A more plausible outcome is that the Labour party will finally come off the fence and decline to support any deal without a “confirmatory” second vote – Labour was also a big loser in the European Parliament poll, shedding votes and seats to the Liberal Democrats and the Greens, both resolutely committed to going back to the voters on Brexit.
After three full years of indecision it may have to be acknowledged that the problem with finding the ideal form of Brexit for the UK cannot be solved, since there is none
No possible outcome to the process has been ruled out, including another election. The outcome preferred by the Irish Government, the deal negotiated by the EU with Mrs May and thrice rejected by the House of Commons, now appears friendless in London.
After three full years of indecision it may have to be acknowledged that the problem with finding the ideal form of Brexit for the UK cannot be solved, since there is none. It is simply too difficult to disengage at low economic and political cost from 45 years of deep integration with the European neighbours.
The problem is not the identification of a form of Brexit, acceptable to British public opinion and to the European Union, which keeps most people happy. The problem is Brexit itself. The entire project was ill-conceived and incapable of delivery.
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