In a truly globalised world, production will flow to where it is most economical to produce a given commodity.

National self-sufficiency has disappeared as a respectable goal of policy. We may regret the trend but it is a fact of modern life, or it was until the present crises in both energy and food for Europe.

As a result of trade and production following relative competitiveness, Ireland has no sugar beet industry, and no flour milling on a commercial scale.

We are now seeing the result of the reliance on the lowest cost source of production.

When something happens, in this case the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we are forced to refocus. We can easily forget the huge swings in Russian agricultural output, especially grain.

Communist system

Under the communist system, Russian agriculture became enormously inefficient, and the country became the largest grain importer in the world.

The US became their main supplier. But the privatisation of farming changed all that. In the year 2000, Russia achieved full self-sufficiency in wheat and exported a net 700,000 tonnes. By 2018, a massive 41 million tonnes of wheat were exported from Russia, making it the largest wheat exporter in the world.

But this explosion in output was achieved with different technology than the Communist collectives had employed. As in eastern Europe and the enormous neighbouring country of Kazakhstan, the old Russian machinery was replaced by new John Deere and Claas tractors and combines, as well as Amazone sprayers and sowing equipment from Germany. In a remarkable paper in the latest edition of The Russian Analytical Digest, it is estimated that Russia imports 40% of its agricultural machinery. With sanctions, some of these firms have simply shut down their Russian operations with no direct access for much needed new machinery or spares.

Russian agriculture is also surprisingly dependent on foreign-produced seeds and pesticides

Some spares will inevitably be channelled through third parties, but prices will be high and service unpredictable to put it at its mildest.

Russian agriculture is also surprisingly dependent on foreign-produced seeds and pesticides. Many large producers are dependent on getting finance at subsidised rates to pay for inputs which, as elsewhere in the world, have risen strongly in price.

All of these factors have persuaded the Russian government to severely limit grain exports until the end of June of this year. Domestic food security will inevitably take precedence over exports. It’s hard to see the pressure easing on international grain markets while the present awful conflicts last.