Last week’s summit of European leaders followed two years after landmark reports arguing for the bloc’s radical reform from Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi, neither of which look alarmist or premature in hindsight. Many other politicians have urged attention to unfinished business, notably the completion of the single market and the currency union.

French president Emmanuel Macron has been seeking accelerated integration in the European Union for even longer, dating to a speech during his first term in 2017, commending what he calls strategic autonomy, tempered with some French attachment to national economic interests. He has more recently responded to what he perceives as the withdrawal of Donald Trump’s US into an America First policy and its reluctance to match European support for Ukraine.

Macron sees costly consequences for European defence but also the implications for the EU’s economic relationship with the US, including industrial policy where the Trump administration has threatened selective tariffs, targeting European export sectors like wine and cars.

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Ireland is perforce facing new challenges in its relationship with Europe in both defence and foreign policy and Government has yet to articulate a clear position.

Just four EU countries out of 27 remain outside NATO. Finland and Sweden abandoned neutrality and joined NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, leaving just Austria and Ireland, plus two small Mediterranean islands, Cyprus and Malta, outside the alliance.

There may be no immediate pressure on the non-members to join – Cyprus in any event has NATO bases operated by the UK and Turkey – but a common EU borrowing instrument to share liability is contemplated and Ireland, as a neutral, could end up helping to foot the bill. National contributions to the EU finances are also on the rise given the overall budgetary pressures, and Ireland’s annual cheque to Brussels is headed upwards even if domestic military spending can be restrained. The UK, outside the EU since Brexit, is an important member of NATO and intends to maintain close military co-operation with the continental members, including a possible financial participation in joint procurement.

There is predictably a row over the amount, amid intense rivalry between the defence industries in the various countries.

Macron is also critical of the giant US tech companies, many of which have European operations based partly in Ireland. Europe does not have indigenous Big Tech platforms with scale comparable to the dominant US operators and he is sensitive to Silicon Valley’s inside track with the Trump administration.

There has been pushback in Washington over the EU’s Digital Services Act, even hysterical accusations that Europe is engaged in the censorship of free speech, citing the intentions of France and Spain to ban children from social media.

Ireland has a horse in this race given the excessive reliance on corporation tax revenues from US multinationals including the tech giants, highlighted repeatedly by the Fiscal Council in its calls for greater caution in budgetary control.

The Irish revenue boom will prove transient if the US changes its domestic tax rules, which does not prevent envious glances from continental EU countries struggling with less-favourable fiscal numbers and prone to misplaced suspicion that Ireland’s corporation tax bonanza is enjoyed at their expense.

Any ‘fortress Europe’ outcome, seeking to substitute a stronger single market for a reduced outward focus on trade with the rest of the world, is not in Ireland’s interests, which is why the foot-dragging on Mercosur from the Government parties and the farm organisations is so puzzling.

The EU needs to prioritise trade deals with partners other than the US and will be wary of China. That leaves Japan, Korea, India, Canada, Australia and South America, and every small open EU economy should be favourably disposed to whatever deals the European Commission can arrange. In Ireland’s case, there is little at risk from a national point of view.

The European Council’s most prominent members, including France, are prone to identify and defend sectors which matter most to them, and Macron has helpfully singled out what he sees as the critical value chains, namely chemicals, steel, cars and defence production. These sectors are of no significance in this country whatever about France, Germany and Italy. Dairying and pharmaceuticals matter a lot more, as do various categories of services. There are no champagne exports.

The performance of Irish MEPs in voting against Mercosur has been criticised by Barry Andrews, a Fianna Fáil member, on the basis that it does not serve any identifiable national interest. There are vital issues on the agenda in Ireland’s relations with EU partners, including the extent of financial liability for shared defence initiatives, with or without neutrality, and national contributions to the escalating EU budget. Andrews is right to be concerned – foot-stamping about Mercosur invites retaliation.