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Brexit talks are reaching a critical point this week. It is clear the UK will not look for an extension of the time. The two sides are far apart, not only on the detail of what they want on particular sectors, but on the overall structure of the future relationship between the EU and the UK.
The EU wants an overall political framework agreement, within which inevitable future disagreements on detail could be discussed and balances struck. The UK, on the other hand, wants individual agreements on different topics like fisheries, agriculture, financial services and so on, where each topic would stand on its own.
Swiss model
All the relationships the EU has with outside countries have general frameworks, except its relationship with Switzerland, which is built on a series of separate agreements of the sort being sought by the UK. The EU has found the Swiss model to be very unsatisfactory, with lots of disputes and standoffs.
If there were to be a general framework agreement between the EU and the UK, of the kind that the EU wants, there would be a forum in which individual disputes between specialists could be finessed and a balance found between unrelated issues, that would preserve the health of the overall EU/UK relationship. In that context, turf wars between individual regulators and arguments between business sectors on either side would not be allowed to escalate to a point that they would poison the overall relationship.
There is an analogy here to the way the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement concerning Northern Ireland worked. It provided for regular intergovernmental conference meetings between senior ministers on either side. Difficult issues or disputes, on which there was media controversy, were defused by saying that they would be considered at the next regular intergovernmental conference in a few weeks’ time. That stratagem was usually enough to take the heat out of the issue for the time being, and by the time the conference did meet, the problem would either have become manageable, or disappeared altogether.
The island of Ireland, and the seas around it, will inevitably be a location for many disputes between the EU and the UK in the years ahead. If there is a trade deal with an overall dispute settlement framework, these disputes will be resolved in a diplomatic way. If, on the other hand, there is no deal, as is increasingly likely, disputes about small things will escalate out of proportion, with high-profile stands being taken, on abstract issues of high principle, like “sovereignty” and “decision-making autonomy”.
I think this question of whether there is a robust and workable overall framework agreement between the EU and the UK is even more determinative of whether the talks succeed or not than questions like fisheries, level playing fields between businesses, state aid, or co-operation on crime and security. If there is a framework, with regular summits and ministerial meetings, some aspects of these issues can be left over for final determination at these summits. If, on the other hand, the UK rejects that and insists on separate agreements on every topic, there will be no deal. In a way, the issues at stake are relatively simple, if they are put in the right context. The problem with finding the right context goes back to the politics of Brexit in Britain.
As a result of the difficulty in finding a parliamentary consensus on what Brexit meant, power has now come to be concentrated in a narrow, and unusually ideological, circle. The group that now dominates English Conservatism makes a fetish of the notion of absolute sovereignty (something we ourselves became familiar with in this country 100 years ago). It simply wants to break all ties with the EU, as it sees doing so, as the best expression of British sovereignty. It forgets that all binding international agreements involve some diminution of freedom of action and the international trade of the UK thrives on that basis.
The other problem, the centralised nature of decision-making in London, is illustrated by the controversy over Dominic Cummings, his trip to Durham and his precipitate return to London. He seems to have felt himself so indispensable to decision-making in Downing Street that he had to rush back. It seems as if prime minister Boris Johnson does not trust the civil service and his other advisers enough to make big decisions in the absence of Cummings. Johnson will seemingly not be able to instruct his Brexit negotiating team on concessions they might make to unblock the talks with the EU unless Cummings is involved in every detail. This is no way to run a great and complex political entity like the United Kingdom, with its complex history, its four component parts and its multitude of interests. There is another aspect of Johnson’s decision-making style which is relevant here. This is his tendency to leave things to the last minute. He did this with his original decision to back Brexit, and with his decision with Leo Varadkar to accept a border in the Irish Sea. He may think he can do something similar next October.
The subject matter of a possible EU/ UK agreement is not susceptible to last minute fixes. The EU side’s negotiating mandate was painstakingly agreed between 27 governments and reflects a subtle balancing of divergent interests within the EU. It can be amended, but not on the back of an envelope and especially not when the EU has so many other internal issues to resolve. So I hope that Boris Johnson realises that if he does not actually want a no deal crash out (and perhaps he does), he needs to do some hard thinking, and give some precise instructions, and do it this week. If the talks do not get back on track this week, I fear they never will.
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