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If the Brexit saga results in a no-deal crash-out, there will be, at least for a period, a hard border in Ireland. This will be a consequence, and a predictable consequence, of policy decision and indecision in the UK.
The Irish Government, with the support of the other EU members, has insisted that the backstop is needed to avoid a hard border. If there is no deal and hence no backstop, it follows that there will be a hard border. This should not be news to anyone. No hard border requires a backstop so no backstop implies a hard border. The tortuous negotiations which have produced the withdrawal agreement, thrice rejected in the House of Commons, were constructed around the objective, shared by the Irish, the EU and the UK, that a hard border should be avoided.
The UK’s failure to sign off on the withdrawal agreement would mean no transition period and the UK becoming overnight a third country, with the same trading arrangements with the EU’s internal market as Brazil or Russia. That means border controls at Calais, Rotterdam and Zeebrugge, not just between Newry and Dundalk.
If the withdrawal agreement fails to materialise, the EU, which includes Ireland but also all other member states, will be treaty-bound to apply the rules and regulations to UK trade that apply to trade with all other third countries
The Irish Government has been downplaying preparations for a hard border, without denying that extensive preparations have been made. There has been an understandable concern that the revelation of thorough preparations would play into the hands of Brexit ultras, angling all along for a no-deal crash-out.
If the withdrawal agreement fails to materialise, the EU, which includes Ireland but also all other member states, will be treaty-bound to apply the rules and regulations to UK trade that apply to trade with all other third countries.
The Republic of Ireland is in no different position than any continental EU country. To be precise, Leo Varadkar and his colleagues will proceed to impose border controls of some description, even if the UK seeks to deflect responsibility by breaching its obligations, under the rules of the World Trade Organisation, to do the same.
Blame
There could still be a deal. If there is no deal, it looks as if there will be a blame game instead and elements in the UK media will parrot the line that it is the Irish Government that has created the hard border. The failure of the UK political system to negotiate a Brexit deal that could survive its own process of parliamentary approval is the fault neither of the Irish Government, or of EU negotiators. It is entirely the fault of the UK. The deal was constructed precisely to meet the UK’s red lines, despite reservations in Brussels that internal market rules were being stretched to accommodate UK requirements in respect of Northern Ireland. As some of the Brussels negotiators have been pointing out, it is the UK that has chosen to depart the European Union. It has not been expelled.
The UK could be facing a fresh election or a re-run of the referendum
The blame game over a hard border in Ireland will not be the only one if the UK crashes out, which could happen by next Thursday’s European Council deadline if no transition period, or Article 50 extension, is secured. The dislocation in the UK itself will be enormous and there is, even at this late stage, every reason to expect sanity to prevail. No major developed economy has ever imposed economic sanctions on itself, which is what the UK would be doing in a crash-out. Unfortunately, serious economic losses would also fall on neighbouring countries, most severely on Ireland.
A further extension of Article 50 may be sought. The UK could be facing a fresh election or a re-run of the referendum and it is possible that an orderly exit as per the withdrawal agreement will finally pass the House of Commons.
Any hard border could also prove to be temporary. After a few weeks, possibly months, of chaos and recrimination, the UK would be back at the negotiating table, perhaps under new leadership, seeking a long-term trading deal with the EU-27.
These concerns do not go away in a no-deal crash-out, unless the UK wants to live with long-term access to the European market no better than is available to Brazil or Russia
And the first set of requirements from the EU-27 would be the same three which feature in the current version of the withdrawal agreement, namely a settling of financial accounts, the protection of EU citizens’ rights, and the arrangements on the EU’s only land border with the departing member, the border in Ireland.
These concerns do not go away in a no-deal crash-out, unless the UK wants to live with long-term access to the European market no better than is available to Brazil or Russia.
The EU-27 will bring the same set of preoccupations back to the table whenever Britannia Unbound comes back, as it would inevitably do, seeking some form of free-trade agreement with its biggest market as a third country. No-deal leads back to a deal.
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